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Introduction

Endogeneity in production function estimation is not a new issue. Endogeneity of inputs can arise
for a variety of reasons: input measurement error, simultaneity of unobservables and inputs, and
endogeneity of "explanatory" outputs in multiple-output distance function analysis (to name a few).
In service industries, these problems are exacerbated in obvious ways. However, one could imagine
that the main challenge in estimating a service production function is the speci cation of the function
itself. In particular, the way that labor is transformed into output may be unclear. Production
in a service industry is typically not "serial" as it might be on a manufacturing assembly line,
where productivity of worker A may only a¤ect the productivity of worker B, who (in turn) only
a¤ects worker C.1 Service industries may be characterized by teams of workers whose individual
productivities are interrelated in complex ways and (in particular) through networks. Consider an
architectural rm which simultaneously produces design plans for a variety of projects with teams
of architects and draftsmen, who may work across multiple projects in a given workday. In this
setting worker interrelatedness may be determined by networks established by a single manager, who
assigns workers to teams based on both observable and unobservable characteristics of workers. This
implies formal and measurable time-varying networks which may be endogenous due to selectivity.2
Understanding network e¤ects in production may be important for worker scheduling and design of
worker incentive schemes.
The purpose of this paper is to specify an econometric model that incorporates peer e¤ects on
worker productivity (output).3 That is, a workers productivity is a function of the productivities
of the co-workers on her team, where teams are assigned by managers. Individual team members
interact through time-varying interaction schemes which serve as proxies for the managerial decision
and which function as the mechanism for group formation and individual interrelatedness. In most
econometric network models, selection into groups is as much an individual choice as is the behavior
that stems from a given network structure.4 In this setting endogeneity problems may arise if the
1 This is not to suggest that a manufacturing process could not be more complicated, but the traditional assembly
line process possesses this feature.
2 There may also be informal networks, but they are not the focus here. Informal networks may arise through
a principle-agent problem of imperfect montioring. A manager may order a worker to split her time evenly on the
two projects, but she may not, in practice. An alternative way to conceptualize this phenomenon is that the formal
network is measured with error.
3 Peer e¤ects have been indicated as one of the main empirical determinants of several important social phenomena
(see Jackson and Zenou, 2013, part III, for a collection of recent studies ).
4 Some studies exploit random assignement. For example, in lab experiments or (infrequently) in eld experiments
a scientist or social planner determines groupings (see, e.g., Falk and Ichino, 2006, or Guryan et al., 2009).
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model does not account for unobserved individual characteristics driving both network formation and
behavior over networks. We consider the unique situation where a manager selects workers into teams
(networks) to produce output, and we call this model a Network Production Function Model. In the
model, network connections are captured by a binary adjacency matrix, where adjacency is speci ed
as a binary indicator of team membership. The salient feature of this model is that team membership
is perfectly observable.5 ;6 In this model, the managers selection decisions depend on the combination
of individual characteristics at the team level, rather than individual-level characteristics. Such
team-level factors contribute to the so called "correlated e¤ects" (Manski, 1993), which could be
confounded with peer e¤ects and lead to identi cation problems.
We use a polychotomous Heckman-type correction to address this problem in the context of
production networks. In team projects, the probability of selecting a worker for the project is not
independent across workers. We exploit this interdependency for the identi cation and estimation
of peer e¤ects in network production functions. This is the main contribution of the paper.
More speci cally, we consider productivity of a single project, involving a two-stage process.
First, the manager chooses a team (lineup) of m workers (m is predetermined) from a population
of n workers to work on the project of interest. Residual workers are assigned to other projects.7
Next, workers work on the project to produce output for a given time period. For the population of
n workers, the n  n adjacency matrix across all projects is potentially endogenous. By focusing on
a single project of interest, we have an m  m submatrix of the adjacency matrix which is exogenous
conditional on selection into the speci c project. Thus, the network endogeneity is reduced to a
selectivity bias, which can be corrected using a xed e¤ect estimator or a polychotomous Heckmantype bias correction procedure due to Lee (1983) and Dahl (2002).8
The resulting selectivity bias term is an inverse mills ratio (in the case of the Lees parametric
estimate) or a single index (in the case of the Dahls semi-parametric estimate), varies across lineups
and time, and can be interpreted in two interesting ways. First, it can be thought of as a xed e¤ect
5 Manski (1993) suggests that it is not possible to identify network e¤ects if researchers do not know how networks
or reference groups are formed by individulas in the network.
6 It is also possible for adjacency to be measured as cumulative time that individuals worked together on a project.
This would be directly measurable from time-cards, but we do not explore it here.
7 We note that, in any period the n - m residual workers are assigned to other projects, and lags of the output
from these projects (as well as the project of interest) are treated as explanatory variables in the output and selection
equations. In this sense our speci cation is not unlike the multiple-output distance function (Fare and Primont, 1990)
where a single output is modeled as functions of the remaining outputs.
8 It is also interesting to note that the word "lineup" evokes an image of workers standing in a line. Our notion
of lineup allows us to abstract from the complicated endogenous network for all the workers to a simple, xed and
complete network of workers in a project.
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that purges and quanti es the correlated e¤ ects of Manski (1993). That is, Manski noted that there
may be unobserved e¤ects, "wherein individuals in the same group tend to behave similarly because
they have similar individual characteristics or face similar institutional environments."9 In this case
the group is the observed lineup, and the "institutional environment" is the managers selection
of the lineup into the project of interest. In this sense we use Heckman (1979) to solve Manskis
correlated e¤ects problem. In fact, in terms of estimation, we employ a xed e¤ect estimator in
the style of Lee (2007) that di¤erences out the correlated e¤ect. Second, the selection bias term
is loosely interpretable as managerial competence or e¢ ciency. That is, all things being equal and
averaging out luck, it is the managers lineup selection that produces any unobserved team e¤ect
and, hence, variability of worker output. This is similar to the notion of ine¢ ciency in the stochastic
frontier literature (Aigner et al., 1977; and Meeusen and van den Broeck, 1977), so our selectivity
bias term can be thought of as e¢ ciency if it increases output and as ine¢ ciency if it lowers it. Also,
insofar as our bias term may be estimated from a rst-stage selection equation, it is interpretable as
x-e¢ ciency in the stochastic frontier literature (Alvarez et al., 2006).10
Our empirical example is the network production function for college basketball. While this may
only loosely represent a service industry production process, it is su¢ cient for the purpose of illustration. In this setting there are n players on a team engaged in two projects at any given period
of time:

ve players interact to produce o¤ense and defense, and n - 5 players sit on the bench

to produce rest (which is inversely correlated with fatigue).11 Our measure of active player productivity is e¢ ciency, which aggregates time-averaged performance statistics on points, rebounds,
blocks, steals, misses, assists, and other measures of o¤ensive and defensive activity for each player.
We include a measure of lagged fatigue as an explanatory variable to control for the productivity
of benched players. Our data are all player substitutions during the regular 2011-2012 season of
the Syracuse University mens college basketball team. We nd statistically signi cant positive production spillovers across players in the same category (guards or forwards), but insigni cant e¤ects
across players in di¤erent categories. When selectivity bias is taken into account, our estimate of
peer e¤ects in productivity is 0.0534. That is, a one unit increase in the average e¢ ciency of the
other active guards (forwards) induces a 0.0534 increase in the e¢ ciency of an individual guard
9 Manski

(1993) page 533.
generally, it is interpretable as another source of heterogeneity. However, it is still interesting to speculate
on the ways it may embody (in)e¢ cienecy.
1 1 We take the managerial decisions and performance of the opposing team as exogenous. In this sense our notion
of strategic equlibrium is only partial.
1 0 More
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(forward) once selectivity bias taken into consideration.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the related literature, while
highlighting the contribution of our paper. Section 3 introduces the econometric speci cation of a
network production model, while Section 4 considers the speci cation and estimation of a network
production model with selectivity. Section 5 provides an empirical example, using data from the
2011-12 Syracuse University Mens basketball team. Section 6 concludes.

2

Related Literature

Our paper lies at the intersection of di¤erent literatures. We briey review them below, while
highlighting our contribution.
2.1

Econometrics of network models

A number of papers have dealt with the identi cation and estimation of peer e¤ects with network data
(see Blume et al., 2011 for an excellent survey). There are three main methodological approaches.
(i) The network is assumed exogenous. Identi cation relies on network topology and estimation is
performed using 2SLS or GMM. The possible presence of unobserved factors responsible for network
endogeneity is treated by network xed e¤ects (see, e.g., Lee, 2007; Bramoullé et al., 2009; CalvóArmengol et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2010; Liu and Lee, 2010).
(ii) Self-selection of individuals into groups is explicitly taken into account. A selection equation
based on individual decisions is added in approach (i) to treat possible network endogeneity. An
individual-level selection correction term is then added in the outcome equation. This approach is
considered in Liu et al. (2012).
(iii) Parametric modeling assumptions and Bayesian inferential methods are employed to integrate a network formation model with the model of behavior over the formed networks. The selection
equation is based on individual decisions as in approach (ii). The network formation and the outcome
equation are estimated jointly (see, e.g., Mele, 2013; Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens, 2013; Hsieh
and Lee, 2013).
In our network production function model selection is done by a social planner (manager), rather
than being the result of individual decisions. Hence, the possible network endogeneity can be treated
by a group-level selection correction term. We show in this paper that the group-level selection
correction term can either be treated as a group xed e¤ect as in approach (i) or be directly estimated
as in approach (ii). Either approach is computationally simple, and thus we do not rely on Bayesian
5

methods.
2.2

Network e¤ects in productivity

There is a limited literature on networks in production processes. Guryan et al. (2009) consider
performance of professional gol ng pairs, but their parings are randomly assigned and the pairings
are competitors not teammates. Bandiera et al. (2009) analyze the productivity of fruit pickers,
but their networks are based on worker characteristics, and not on managerial formation of teams.
Mas and Moretti (2009) consider peer e¤ects in the performance of supermarket cashiers, but do
not speci cally employ teams or networks in their analysis. Hamilton et al. (2003) analyze the e¤ect
of teams on clothing manufacturing, but do not exploit team composition in a network analysis
framework. In all these studies, when production networks or pairings are employed, they are
assumed exogenous. Here, we specify a model where endogeneity is assured but replaced with
team-level selectivity bias, which can be corrected using a xed e¤ect estimator or a polychotomous
Heckman-type bias correction procedure.
2.3

Production function literature

Our focus is a single rm where the unit of observation is the worker who is observed over time.
This is in contrast to the spatial production function work of Druska and Horrace (2004) or Glass
et al. (2013), where the unit of observation is the rm, and exogenous networks are conceptualized
as output/input spillovers across rms (or countries) measured as geographic distances or contiguity
in a spatial estimation framework, and where consistency arguments are for large numbers of rms
(or countries). In these papers it is not easy to conceptualize the network (spillover) mechanism
or to argue that the adjacency matrix is the correct proxy for the mechanism.12 In our case (the
single rm) the network mechanism is clearly based on labor force peer-e¤ects (e.g., Kandel and
Lazear, 1992), and the adjacency matrix, based on the managers assignments, would seem to be
an excellent proxy for this mechanism.13 The downside to our approach is that employee-level
data (administrative data) may not be available to the econometrician. However, the methods
considered herein could be used by managers, and the data available to them on employee and
project characteristics would be quite detailed. Fortunately for us, the econometric model is also
1 2 In their defense Druska and Horraces distance and contiguity networks are a proxy for infrastructure (roads
and bridges) on the island of Java. They nd strong output spillovers across rice farms in the dry season and weak
spillovers in the rainy season, when travel between villages on the island may be di¢ cult.
1 3 Manski (1993) argues that the spatial correlation model "makes sense in studies of small-group interactions, where
the sample is composed of clusters of friends, co-workers, or household members... But it does not make sense in
studies of neighborhood and other large-group e¤ects, where the sample members are randomly chosen individuals."

6

suited for estimation of peer e¤ects in sports teams, where all networks (the coachs decisions)
are observed and where performance is directly measurable by the econometrician. Therefore, we
illustrate our model using data from the Syracuse University Mens College Basketball team.

3

A General Network Production Model

Consider a

rm with n workers and a manager that allocates workers to various projects (peer

groups) in each time period t = 1; ::; T . The number and composition of projects is unimportant
to the econometric speci cation, but they may have implications for identi cation and estimation.
When the manager allocates workers to projects she explicitly speci es an n  n adjacency matrix
which determines the interrelatedness of the workers productivity. Let the adjacency matrix be
denoted by Aot = [aoij;t ], where aoij;t = 1 if workers i and j are assigned to the same project in period
t and aoij;t = 0 otherwise. We set aoii;t = 0. Let the row-normalized Aot be At = [aij;t ], where
Pn
o
aij;t = aoij;t = k=1 aik;t
.14 Then productivity of the worker i in period t is given by
yit = 

Pn

j=1

aij;t yjt + xit + uit :

(1)

In this model, the dependent variable yit is the productivity of worker i in period t. The term
Pn
j=1 aij;t yjt is the average productivity of worker is co-workers assigned to the same project as i in
period t, with its coe¢ cient  capturing the peer e¤ect. xit is a 1  kx vector of exogenous variables.

uit is the regression disturbance. In matrix form, (1) can be written as

Yt = At Yt + Xt + Ut ;

(2)

where Yt = (y1t ;    ; ynt )0 , Xt = (x01t ;    ; x0nt )0 , and Ut = (u1t ;    ; unt )0 .
If we assume that At is exogenous so that E(Ut jAt ; Xt ) = 0, then model (2) can be estimated
using spatial panel data methods (see Lee and Yu, 2010 for a survey). However, it is reasonable to
believe that the manager may have some information about Ut and her choices of how to allocate
workers to projects may be correlated with Ut . If this is the case, then E(Ut jAt ; Xt ) =
6 0 and At is
endogenous.
To

nd a remedy for the problem of endogenous adjacency matrix, we focus on the workers

allocated to a speci c project. Let dit be an indicator variable such that dit = 1 if worker is assigned
1 4 For

simplicity, we assume no worker is assigned to a project alone so that

7

Pn

k=1

o
aik;t
> 0 for all i.

to the project in period t and dit = 0 otherwise. Suppose mt workers are allocated to the project.
Then, for worker i assigned to the project (i.e. dit = 1), (1) can be written as

yit = 

1 Pn
djt yjt + xit + E(uit jDt ) + uit ;
6
mt j =1;j=i

(3)

where Dt = (d1t ;    ; dnt )0 and uit = uit - E(uit jDt ). By construction, E(uit jDt ) = 0 and, thus, the
weights djt in the peer e¤ect regressor can be considered exogenous. We refer to E(uit jDt ) as the
selectivity bias.
Note, as mt is often predetermined (e.g., in sports games, the number of active players mt is
xed), dit is not independent across i. Hence, in the our econometric model, instead of modeling the
probability of a certain worker is assigned to a project (i.e. Pr(dit = 1)), we consider the probability
of a set of workers (a lineup) is assigned to a project.

4

A Network Model with Selectivity

4.1

The econometric model

In time period t, the manager allocates a lineup of mt workers from a set of n workers to a project.15
Suppose there are qt possible lineups, with a lineup denoted by Ls for s = 1;    ; qt . Then, the
manager allocates lineup Ls to the project in period t if and only if dst > maxr6=s drt , where
dst =  st +  st ;

for s = 1;    ; qt :

(4)

In (4),  st is the deterministic component of dst and  st is a scalar random innovation with zero mean
and unit variance. Let dst be a dummy variable such that dst = 1 if the lineup Ls is chosen to play

in period t and dst = 0 otherwise. Then, dst = 1 if and only if st < 0 where st = maxr=s
drt
- dst .
6

The productivity of lineup Ls in period t is given by the following model

Yst = Wt Yst + Xst + Ust :

(5)

In (5), Yst = [yit ]i2Ls is an mt  1 vector of observations on the dependent variable of the workers
in lineup Ls in period t. Wt is a constant weighting matrix given by Wt =

1
0
mt -1 (1mt 1mt

- Imt ).

Wt Yst measures the average productivity of a workers co-workers in lineup Ls in period t, with
15 m
t

is assumed to be predetermined.
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its coe¢ cient  capturing the peer e¤ect. Xst = [xit ]i2Ls is an mt  kx matrix of observations
on kx exogenous variables of the workers in lineup Ls in period t. Ust is an mt  1 vector of
regression disturbances such that Ust  i:i:d:(0; ). We allow for possible correlation between Ust
and  t = ( 1t ;    ;  qt ;t ) such that
E(Ust jdst = 1;  t ) = s ( t )1mt ;

(6)

where  t = ( 1t ;    ;  qt ;t ).
A possible speci cation of Ust that leads to (6) is given by

Ust =

where

st

st 1mt

+ Vst ;

(7)

is an i.i.d. time-varying lineup-speci c error component with mean zero and variance

 2 , and Vst is an mt  1 vector of i.i.d. random innovations with mean zero and variance  2v . The
error component

st

can be interpreted as a random shock in period t that may a¤ect di¤erent

lineups di¤erently. Suppose the manager has some information about the realization of

st

but no

information about that of Vst when she chooses a lineup. Then,

E(Ust jdst = 1;  t ) = E(
where gst (

st ; st j t )

st jst

< 0;  t )1mt =

RR0

-1

is the conditional joint density of

st gst ( st ; st j t )

Pr(st < 0j t )
st

dst d

st 1mt

= s ( t )1mt ;

and st .16


Let Ust
= Ust - s ( t )1mt . (5) can be written as


Yst = Wt Yst + Xst + s ( t )1mt + Ust
:

(8)

The selectivity bias s ( t ) introduces a group correlated e¤ect (Manski, 1993) to the model. As
pointed out by Dahl (2002), semi-parametric estimation of  and

along with the unknown function

s () would face the the curse of dimensionality due to the presence of a large number of alternatives. To make the estimation feasible, restrictions need to be imposed on s (). In the following
subsections, we consider three di¤erent approaches for estimation of (8).
1 6 The speci cation given by (7) is merely an example to motivate the assumption (6). The validity of the proposed
estimators does not rely on this speci cation.
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4.2

The parametric selection correction approach



drt
- dst
. Let () and
Let Fst (j t ) denote the conditional distribution function of st  maxr=s
6

() denote the standard normal distribution and density respectively. Lee (1983) suggests using the
transformation Jst ()  -1 (Fst (j t )) to reduce the dimensionality of the selectivity bias. In terms
of Jst (st ), the selectivity bias is given by

E(Ust jdst = 1;  t ) = E[Ust jJst (st ) < Jst (0);  t ]:
Note, by construction, Jst (st ) is a standard normal random variable and its marginal distribution
does not depend on  t . However, the joint distribution of Ust and Jst (st ) may still depend on  t .
As pointed out by Dahl (2002) and Bourguignon et al. (2007), the following assumption is implicitly
imposed in Lee (1983).
Assumption 1 The joint distribution of Ust and Jst (st ) does not depend on  t .
Assumption 1 implies that E[Ust jJst (st ) < Jst (0);  t ] = E[Ust jJst (st ) < Jst (0)]. Furthermore, to
obtain an explicit functional form of the selectivity bias, we make the following assumption that is
widely used in empirical studies.
Assumption 2 Ust and Jst (st ) are i.i.d. with a joint normal distribution given by17
2
6
4

3

2

3 2


7
6 0 7 6
5  N (4 5 ; 4
Jst (st )
0
 12 10mt
Ust

3

 12 1mt 7
5):
1

(9)

Given Assumption 2, the selectivity bias is given by

E(Ust jdst = 1;  t ) = - 12

(Jst (0))
1m :
Fst (0j t ) t

(10)

Let Pst = Pr(dst = 1j t ) be the probability of choosing lineup Ls in period t given  t . As E(Ust jdst =
1;  t ) = s ( t )1mt , Jst (0) = -1 (Fst (0j t )) and Pst = Fst (0j t ), it follows from (10) that

s ( t ) = - 12
1 7 The

(-1 (Pst ))
:
Pst

likelihood function of the model based on the joint normal distribution (9) is given in Appendix A.
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(11)

The transformation using Jst () greatly reduces the dimensionality of the multiple index function
s ( t ) because it allows s ( t ) to depend on  t only through Pst with a single unknown parameter
 12 . Substitution of (11) into (8) gives

Yst = Wt Yst + Xst -  12

(-1 (Pst ))

1mt + Ust
:
Pst

(12)

For the network model, Lees approach can be implemented as follows.
Step 1: Let  st = zst , where zit is a 1  kz vector of exogenous variables. Then,

can be

estimated by maximizing the likelihood function

ln L =

qt
T P
P

dst ln Pst :

(13)

t=1 s=1

It proves convenient to assume that  st is independently and identically Gumbel distributed so that
Pqt
Pst = exp(zst )= r=1
exp(zrt ) (McFadden, 1974). Then, can be estimated by a conditional
logit estimator ^.

Pqt
exp(zrt ^) obtained in the rst
Step 2: With the predicted probabilities P^st = exp(zst ^)= r=1

step, we consider the feasible counterpart of (12)

Yst = Wt Yst + Xst -  12
and estimate (;

0

(-1 (P^st ))

1mt + Ust
;
P^st

(14)

;  12 )0 by the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator with linearly independent

columns in Wt Xst as instruments for Wt Yst . The correct asymptotic covariance matrix of the 2SLS
estimator can be derived in a similar way as in Lee et al. (1980) with appropriate modi cations.
4.3

The semi-parametric selection correction approach

Dahl (2002) proposes an alternative selection correction approach based on the index su¢ ciency
assumption that the joint distribution of Ust and st depends on  t only through Pst = Pr(dst =
1j t ). Based on this idea, we impose the following assumption to reduce the dimensionality of the
selectivity bias.
Assumption 3 s ( t ) = (Pst ).

11

Assumption 3 implies that the multiple index selectivity bias E(Ust jdst = 1;  t ) depends on  t
only through Pst , and, thus, equation (8) becomes

Yst = Wt Yst + Xst + (Pst )1mt + Ust
:

(15)

For the parametric approach, Assumption 2 implies that the functional form of () is given by
(Pst ) = - 12 (-1 (Pst ))=Pst . For the semi-parametric approach, we approximate (Pst ) by series
expansions (see, Andrews, 1991; Newey, 1997) without imposing functional form assumptions on
().
Thus, the semi-parametric selection correction approach can be implemented in a similar two-step
procedure as the parametric approach.
Step 1: We obtain the predicted probabilities P^st from, say, a conditional conditional logit
regression.
Step 2: We replace (Pst ) in (15) by its (feasible) series approximation

PK

the functions bk () are referred to as the basis functions,18 and estimate (;

k=1

k bk (P^st ), where

0 0

) together with the

series expansion coe¢ cients k by the 2SLS estimator with linearly independent columns in Wt Xst
as instruments for Wt Yst .19
4.4

The

xed-e¤ect approach

From a di¤erent perspective, the selectivity bias s ( t ) in (8) can be considered as a time-varying
lineup-speci c xed e¤ect. To avoid estimating the unknown function s (), we can apply a within
transformation to eliminate this term from (8).
Suppose Xst = [X1;st ; 1mt x2;st ], where X1;st is an mt k1 matrix of observations on k1 individualvarying exogenous variables and x2;st is a 1  k2 vector of individual-invariant exogenous variables
(k1 + k2 = kx ). Then, equation (8) can be written as

Yst = Wt Yst + X1;st

Let Qt = Imt -

1
0
mt 1mt 1mt

1

+ 1mt x2;st

2


+ s ( t )1mt + Ust
:

(16)

denote the within-transformation projector. Then, as Qt 1mt = 0 and

1 8 Dahl

(2002) nd similar results in his application using either polynomial or Fourier series as basis functions.
consistency and asymptotic normality, the number of basis functions should increase with the sample size
(see, Andrews, 1991; Newey, 1997). In practice, the number of basis functions is chosen by the researcher.
1 9 For
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Qt Ust
= Qt Ust , pre-multiplication of (8) by Qt gives

Qt Yst = Qt Wt Yst + Qt X1;st

Then,  and

1

1

+ Qt Ust :

(17)

can be estimated from the within model (17) by the conditional maximum likelihood

(CML) approach in Lee (2007).20
The xed-e¤ect approach does not impose any restrictions on s ( t ). However, given the special
structure of the weighting matrix Wt , the workers in the chosen lineup form a complete network.
The within transformation may cause an identi cation problem similar to the one studied in Lee
(2007). This can be seen from the reduced form equation of (17). Suppose jj < 1, then it follows
from (5) that
Yst = (Imt - Wt )-1 X1;st
For Wt =

1
0
mt -1 (1mt 1mt -Imt ),

1

+ (Imt - Wt )-1 Ust :

we have Qt (Imt -Wt )-1 =

mt -1
mt -1+ Qt .

(18)

Therefore, pre-multiplication

of (18) by Qt gives
Qt Yst =

mt - 1
Qt X1;st
mt - 1 + 

1

+

mt - 1
Qt Ust :
mt - 1 + 

(19)

From (19), we can see that the within model (17) can be identi ed if mt varies over t. On the other
hand, if mt = m for all t, then the peer e¤ect coe¢ cient  cannot be identi ed from

1

after the

within transformation.
To identify the peer e¤ect when mt = m for all t, we need to introduce some exclusion restrictions.
o
o
One possibility is to introduce heterogenous peer e¤ects. Let W1s
= [wij;1s
] be an adjacency matrix
o
o
with wij;1s
= 1 if the ith and jth workers in the lineup s are of the same type and wij;1s
= 0 otherwise.
o
o
o
Let W2s
= [wij;2s
] be an adjacency matrix with wij;2s
= 1 if the ith and jth workers in the lineup s
o
are of di¤erent types and wij;2s
= 0. By construction,

1
o
m-1 (W1s

o
+ W2s
)=W 

1
0
m-1 (1m 1m

- Im ).

o
o
Let W1s and W2s be row-normalized W1s
and W2s
respectively, such that W1s 1m = W2s 1m = 1m .21

PT
CML estimator is consistent and asymptotically normal as in Lee (2007) as the sample size
t=1 mt goes
to in nity.
2 1 Sometimes, W 0 (or W 0 ) may have a row of zeros. For example, if worker i has no co-worker of the same type in a
s1
s2
o
lineup, then wij;1s
= 0 for all j. Then, the corresponding row of Ws1 (or Ws2 ) is also zero. As a result, Ws1 1mt 6= 1mt
(or Ws2 1mt 6= 1mt ), and the likelihood function cannot be derived for the transformed dependent variable Qt Yst (see
Liu and Lee, 2010). In this case, the model after within transformation given by (21) can be estimated by the GMM
approach in Liu and Lee (2010).
2 0 The
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Then, (16) can be generalized to a model with heterogenous peer e¤ects given by

Yst = 1 W1s Yst + 2 W2s Yst + X1;st

1

+ 1mt x2;st

2


+ s ( t )1mt + Ust
;

where 1 captures the same-type peer e¤ect and 2 captures the cross-type peer e¤ect.
multiplying (20) by Q = Im -

1
0
m 1m 1m ,

(20)

Pre-

we have

QYst = 1 QW1s Yst + 2 QW2s Yst + QX1;st

1

+ QUst :

(21)

As (Im - 1 W1s - 2 W2s )-1 = 1 W1s (Im - 1 W1s - 2 W2s )-1 + 2 W2s (Im - 1 W1s - 2 W2s )-1 + Im ,
it follows from the reduced form equation of (20) that

QYst

=

Q(Im - 1 W1s - 2 W2s )-1 X1;st

=

1 QW1s (Im - 1 W1s - 2 W2s )-1 X1;st
+QX1;st

=

1

1


+ Q(Im1 - 1 W1s - 2 W2s )-1 Ust
1

(22)

+ 2 QW2s (Im - 1 W1s - 2 W2s )-1 X1;st

1


+ Q(Im1 - 1 W1s - 2 W2s )-1 Ust

1 E(QW1s Yst jXst ; dst ) + 2 E(QW2s Yst jXst ; dst ) + QX1;st

1


+Q(Im1 - 1 W1s - 2 W2s )-1 Ust
:

Therefore, (1 ; 2 ;

0
1)

can be separately identi ed if E(QW1s Yst jXst ; dst ), E(QW2s Yst jXst ; dst ), and

columns in QX1;st are linearly independent for some t.
To better understand this identi cation condition, we consider a special case that 1 = 2 = 0
in the data generating process. In this case, it follows from the reduced form equation of (20) that
E(QW1s Yst jXst ; dst ) = QW1s X1;st

1

and E(QW2s Yst jXst ; dst ) = QW2s X1;st

1.

Thus, a necessary

condition for E(QW1s Yst jXst ; dst ), E(QW2s Yst jXst ; dst ), and QX1;st to be linearly independent is
0
that QW1s , QW2s and Q are linearly independent. Although QW1s
+ QW20s = (m - 1)QW = -Q,

for the row normalized adjacency matrices W1s and W2s , QW1s , QW2s and Q can still be linearly
independent in general. Therefore, model (21) can be identi ed. The CML estimator in Lee et al.
(2010) can be easily generalized to estimate (21).
To summarize, for model (16), the xed-e¤ect approach can be implemented by the following
steps.
Step 1: We estimate the within equation (17) by the CML estimator in Lee (2007).
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Step 2: We obtain the predicted probabilities P^st from, say, a conditional logit regression.
Step 3: Let r^st =

1 0
m 1m (Yst

- W
^ t Yst - X1;st ^ 1 ), where 
^ and ^ 1 are the rst-step estimates. We

consider the regression
r^st = x2;st

2

+ (P^st ) +  st ;

(23)

where the selectivity bias (P^st ) is either given by - 12 (-1 (P^st ))=P^st in the parametric approach
PK
or approximated by k=1 k bk (P^st ) in the semi-parametric approach, and  st is the error term. We
estimate

4.5

2

together with the unknown parameters in (P^st ) by the OLS estimator.

Comparison of the estimation approaches

Like other Heckman-type two-step selection bias correction procedures, the two approaches proposed
in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 have the advantage of computational simplicity. However, both approaches
impose strong restrictions on the selectivity bias s ( t ) to reduce its dimensionality.22 Furthermore,
because of the endogeneity of the peer e¤ect regressor, the model needs to estimated by the 2SLS
estimator that relies on the existence of valid and relevant instruments. This may be quite challenging
in empirical applications. In our empirical example, for instance, the valid instruments are quite
weak, although we experimented with several sets of instruments. Therefore, the 2SLS estimates
may not be reliable.
On the other hand, the

xed e¤ect approach proposed in Section 4.4 does not impose any

restrictions on the selectivity bias s ( t ). After we eliminate the selectivity bias using the within
transformation, we can use the CML or GMM estimator to estimate the peer e¤ect. The CML and
GMM exploit both linear and quadratic moment conditions, and, thus, may outperform the 2SLS
estimator that only uses linear moment conditions, when the linear moment conditions are weak (see,
Lee et al., 2010; Liu and Lee, 2010). However, as shown in Section 4.4, the within transformation
makes the identi cation of the peer e¤ect more challenging because the workers in the chosen lineup
form a complete network. In particular, we show that the within equation is not identi ed if mt
does not vary over time. In this case identi cation can be achieved by imposing exclusion restrictions
through heterogenous peer e¤ects.
2 2 See

Assumptions 1 and 2 for the parametric approach and Assumption 3 for the semi-parametric approach.
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5

An Empirical Illustration

As an empirical illustration, we estimate a network production function for a basketball team, where
a coach selects lineups of players over the course of a game. As the valid instruments turn out to be
quite weak in the empirical example, with the rst stage F statistic lower than 5 (J. and Yogo, 2005),
estimators that leverages 2SLS may not be reliable for this data. Hence, we use the xed e¤ect
estimation approach. As the number of active players is constant over time (i.e., mt = m), we split
players into two types, guards and forwards, to identify the peer e¤ects. We detail the application
of the xed e¤ect estimator for the speci cation considered in the empirical example in Appendix
B.
5.1

Data

Our data are for the Syracuse University Mens Basketball team over the 2011-2012 season. The
team played 33 games during the regular season (we exclude March Madness games). We de ne
a time period as the time interval between two consecutive substitutions.23 We removed overtime
periods from the data, since the managers allocation strategy may be di¤erent in overtime. We
removed time periods of less than 30 seconds, since there might not be enough observations on
playersproductivities in those extremely short periods. We thus observe 79 di¤erent lineups (of 5
active players) over 448 time periods, in total 2,240 observations.24
There are two outputs in a basketball game: the production of o¤ense/defense (some measure
related to the "on court" productivity of active players) and rest (players sitting on the bench).25
We take the opposing teams strategy as exogenous, using only a measure of the teams Rating
Percentage Index (RPI) from the previous year which we describe below.
5.2

Variable de nition

The dependent variable Yst of equation (20) is measured using using the e¢ ciency statistic EF Fit :

EF Fit = (P Tit + REBit + ASTit + ST Lit + BLKit - M F Git - M F Tit - T Oit )=M insit
2 3 Our

time periods have irregular length.
important problem, which is common to most existing empirical studies, is a possible misspeci cation of the
network structure. The main threats are sampling issues due to the fact that only a subset of connections are observed
(see, e.g., Chandrasekhar and Lewis, 2011; Lin, 2013; Liu et al., 2013). In our case, the coach selects lineups to produce
output, so that networks are accurately measured.
2 5 It could be argued that there a multiple o¤ensive outputs (points, rebounds, assists, etc.) and multiple defensive
outputs (steals, blocks, rebounds, etc.). However our purpose is to illustrate the econometric contribution, and not
to perform a comprehensive empirical analysis.
2 4 An
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where P Tit is points, REBit is rebounds, ASTit is assists, ST Lit is steals, BLKit is blocks, M F Git
is missed eld goals, M F Tit is missed free throws, T Oit is turn overs, and M insit is minutes played
for player i in period t.26 These are period-by-period statistics and not season-long aggregates.
Over the course of the entire season and across players the average e¢ ciency is 0.37 with a standard
deviation of 1.07, a minimum of -3.75, and a maximum of 8.28. This is not calculated when a player
is on the bench.
The individual-varying exogenous variables in the main equation (the X1;st s) are Experienceit
and F atigueit . Experienceit is minutes played from the start of the game to the end of period t - 1.
It has and average of 9.91 minutes, a standard deviation of 7.81, a minimum of 0, and a maximum
of 37.58 minutes. For active player i in period t - 1, F atigueit is minutes continuously played until
the end of period t - 1; for inactive players in period t - 1, fatigue is 0. The average fatigue across
the entire season is 3.78 minutes with a standard deviation of 5.09 minutes. The high variance is
due to the fact that there are players who almost always continuously play and those who almost
never play.
The exogenous variables that do not vary over i in the main equation (the x2;st s) are the opposing
teams Rating Percentage Index (RP It ), Homet , a dummy variable equal to 1 if the game is played
in the Syracuse University Carrier Done (two-thirds of the games were played at home in the 20112012 season), and 2nd-Halft , a dummy variable equal to 1 if the current period is in the second
half of the game. The rating percentage index is one of the systems used to rank NCAA teams and
is based on a teams wins, losses and its strength of schedule. This system has been in use in college
basketball since 1981 to aid in the selecting and seeding of teams appearing in the 68-team mens
tournament (March Madness). The index is based on a teams winning percentage, its opponents
winning percentage, and the winning percentage of those opponentsopponents. For the teams in
our data the average RP I from the 2010-11 season is 0.55 with a standard deviation of 0.08.
The exogenous variables in the selection equation are lineup-level aggregations of variables from
the main equation. Lineup-ef f iciencyst is the total e¢ ciency score of the lineup s from the start
of the game until the end of period t - 1. It has an average of 1.63 and a standard deviation of
1.22. Lineup-experiencest is the total minutes played by the lineup at the end of period t - 1. It
has an average of 49.57 minutes and a standard deviation of 34.03 minutes. Lineup-f atiguest is
2 6 This assumes equal weights for each individual productive activities. Other weighting schemes could be considered,
but a similar e¢ ciency measure is employed by the National Basketball Association to rank player productivity, so
we use it as a matter of convenience.
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the total minutes continuously played by the lineup at the end of period t - 1. It has an average of
18.92 minutes and a standard deviation of 14.06 minutes. Lineup-f oulsst is the total fouls by the
lineup at the end of period t - 1. It has an average of 3.13 fouls and a standard deviation of 2.77
fouls. One-substitutiont is a dummy variable equal to 1, if one player was substituted to achieve
the lineup at time t. It has an average of 0.68 and a standard deviation of 0.46. T wo-substitutiont
is a dummy variable equal to 1, if two players were substituted to achieve the lineup at time t. It
has an average of 0.22 and a standard deviation of 0.42. The omitted category is three or more
players were substituted. Variable de nitions and descriptive statistics are summarized in Appendix
C (Table C.1).
5.3

Estimation results

5.3.1

Results without selectivity bias correction

Let us start by presenting the ML estimation results without accounting for selectivity bias (Lee,
2004). As the number of time periods (T = 448) is much larger than the number of players in
the Syracuse University Mens Basketball team (n = 19), we can use player dummies to control for
unobserved player-speci c characteristics. Results are contained in Table 1.
[insert Table 1 here]
Model 1 considers the benchmark outcome equation (5) with homogenous peer e¤ects.27 The
estimation results are reported in column 1 of Table 1. In line with expectations, it appears that
players experience is positively correlated with his productivity (0:0154 e¢ ciency units per minute
played), and the e¤ect of fatigue is negative (-0:0083 e¢ ciency units per minute continuously
played), although it is not statistically signi cant. The quality of the opposing team plays a strong
role in decreasing players productivity (statistically signi cant -1:1677), and the second-half of a
game seems to be less productive that the rst half (signi cant -0:2159). Peer e¤ects in productivity
appear positive and statistically signi cant. In terms of magnitude, an unit increase in the average
e¢ ciency of the teammates induces a 0:0841 increase in the e¢ ciency of the individual player.
Model 2 of Table 1 considers heterogenous peer e¤ects. We split players into two types, guards
and forwards (no di¤erentiation of centers from forwards), and distinguish between peer e¤ects
arising from "same-type" teammates and peer e¤ects arising from "cross-type" teammates. The
estimation results are reported in column 2 of Table 1. It appears that the peer e¤ects are mostly
2 7 We

assume normality of the error distribution so that Ust  i:i:d:N (0;  2 Im ):
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due to interactions between players of the same type. The same-type peer e¤ect is 0:0638 (signi cant)
and the cross-type peer e¤ect is 0:0345 (insigni cant). It appears that once we condition on observed
and unobserved player characteristics, there are no endogenous e¤ects at work between players of
di¤erent types.
Model 3 of Table 1 is the restricted heterogenous peer e¤ects where we only consider the sametype peer e¤ect. The estimation results reported in column 3 of Table 1 remain roughly unchanged
from Model 2.
5.3.2

Results with selectivity bias correction

As explained in Section 4.4 and detailed in Appendix B, the xed-e¤ect approach can be implemented
in three steps. First, we use a within transformation to eliminate selectivity bias and estimate the
transformed outcome equation by the CML approach (detailed in Section B.2). Covariates that do
not vary at the individual level (RP I, Home and 2nd-Half ) are eliminated by the within group
transformation. As the number of active players is constant over time (i.e. mt = m), the transformed
outcome equation is not identi ed for Model 1. Hence, we have to exploit heterogenous peer e¤ects
to achieve identi cation. The xed-e¤ect CML estimation results are reported in Table 2.
[insert Table 2 here]
With both same-type and cross-type peer e¤ects in Model 2, the peer e¤ects are not signi cant
due to multicollinearity of those two e¤ects in our data. When we only consider the same-type peer
e¤ect in Model 3, the peer e¤ect is positive and statistically signi cant, but lower in magnitude than
the corresponding estimate in Table 1 without selectivity bias correction. In line with the estimates
in Table 1, a players experience is positively associated with her performance. The e¤ect of fatigue
is negative and becomes statistically signi cant once selectivity bias is corrected. Furthermore, the
likelihood ratio test (test statistic is 0:96) fails to reject the restriction that cross-type peer e¤ect is
zero at conventional signi cance levels.
[insert Table 3 here]
Table 3 reports the second step conditional logit estimation of the selection equation.28 The
estimates reveal the factors that are important when the coach selects the lineup. In particular, the
2 8 To reduce the total number of alternatives, we restrict the set of possible lineups to the lineups that actually
employed by the coach in a game.
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past productivity, fatigue and number of fouls of the players in a lineup play important roles in the
coachs lineup choices.
[insert Table 4 here]
Table 4 reports the third step, where the e¤ects of the individual-invariant regressors are recovered
and the selectivity bias is estimated. The estimation procedure is detailed in Section B.3. For the
parametric approach, the joint normality assumption (9) implies the selectivity bias has a speci c
functional form (11) with a single unknown parameter  12 . For the semiparametric approach, the
selectivity bias is approximated by a series expansion. For the parametric approach, the estimate of
 12 is insigni cant. When parametric restrictions are removed, the Wald test suggests the coe¢ cients
of the series expansion are jointly signi cant and hence selection does play a role in the outcome
equation. The estimated e¤ects of the individual-invariant regressors are in line with the estimates
in Table 1 except the coe¢ cient of the home game dummy is now positive.

6

Conclusion

This paper makes contributions to both the network and production function literatures. The proposed network production function mitigates traditional problems in the identi cation and estimation of peer e¤ects, including endogenous network formation and network topology misspeci cation.
In our proposed model, the network is (and peer groups are) well-de ned, and selection into groups
is not an individual choice but the decision of a manager (social planner) who has historical information on the observable and unobservable characteristics of the workers. This allows selection into
a single project to be at the team-level, and allows the network structure to be xed by the manager
(predetermined for the workers), who selects teams (lineups) into the set structure. The selection
process can be modelled in a Heckman-type framework (Heckman, 1979). Being at the team level,
the selection correction term captures the "correlated e¤ects" of Manski (1993). Thus, our approach
tackles in a single step the selection and the corrected e¤ects problems in the network literature.
The solution comes at a cost of the need for administrative data on each workers history which may
not be readily available.
Regarding the production function literature, our analysis considers issues related to the estimation of managerial e¢ ciency (the managerial selection bias correction term), the determinants of
e¢ ciency through the selection equation, and multi-output (project) distance functions.
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Our empirical example suggests that peer e¤ects exist among players in a basketball game and
that a selectivity bias correction matters.
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Appendices
A

The Likelihood Function under Joint Normality

If Ust  N (0; ), the density function of Yst is
1
f (Yst ) = (2)-mt =2 jj-1=2 jI - Wt j exp(- (Yst - Wt Yst - Xst )0 -1 (Yst - Wt Yst - Xst )):
2
Furthermore, if Ust and Jst (st ) are i.i.d. with a joint normal distribution given by (9), the conditional
distribution of Jst (st ) given Yst is
2 0
Jst (st )jYst  N ( 12 10m -1 (Yst - Wt Yst - Xst ); 1 -  12
1m -1 1m ):

Then, the log-likelihood function of equations (4) and (5) is given by

ln L =
=

B

pt
T P
P

t=1 s=1
pt
T P
P

dst [ln f (Jst (st )jYst ) + ln f (Yst )]

Jst (zst ) -  12 10m -1 (Yst - Wt Yst - Xst )
p
)
1 -  212 10m -1 1m
t=1 s=1
mt
1
1
ln 2 - ln jj + ln jImt - Wt j - (Yst - Wt Yst - Xst )0 -1 (Yst - Wt Yst - Xst )]:
2
2
2
dst [ln (

The Empirical Model and the Fixed E¤ect Estimator

In this appendix, we detail the xed e¤ect estimator for the speci cation considered in the empirical
example.
B.1

The empirical model

In the empirical application, we assume the manager chooses lineup s in period t (i.e., dst = 1), if

dst > maxr=s
drt
, where
6

dst = zst +  st ;

for s = 1;    ; qt :

We assume  st is independently and identically Gumbel distributed so that Pst = Pr(dst = 1) =
Pqt
exp(zrt ).
exp(zst )= r=1
24

The outcome equation of the chosen lineup s in period t is given by

Yst = 1 W1s Yst + 2 W2s Yst + X1;st

where Ust =

st 1m + Vst

with

st

1

+ 1m x2;st

2

+ Ust ;

(24)

 N (0;  2 ) and Vst  N (0;  2v Im ). We assume, when the manager

chooses a lineup, she has no information about the realization of individual random innovations Vst
but may has some information about the random shock

E(Ust jdst = 1;  t ) = E(

st jdst

st .

Thus,

= 1;  t )1m = s ( t )1m ;

where  t = ( 1t ;    ;  qt ;t ) and  st = zst . Then, the selection bias corrected outcome equation is
Yst = 1 W1s Yst + 2 W2s Yst + X1;st

1

+ 1m x2;st

2


+ s ( t )1m + Ust
;



where Ust
= Ust - s ( t )1m . By construction, E(Ust
jdst = 1;  t ) = 0.

B.2

Estimation of the peer e¤ect

To estimate the peer e¤ect coe¢ cients (1 ; 2 ), we rst eliminate the selectivity bias using a within
transformation. Premultiplying (24) by Q = Im -

1
0
m 1m 1m ,

we have

QYst = 1 QW1s Yst + 2 QW2s Yst + QX1;st

1

+ QVst :

(25)

To estimate (25), we generalize the CML approach in Lee, Liu and Lin (2010). The transformed
disturbances QVst in (25) are linearly dependent because its variance matrix  2 Q is singular. Following Lee, Liu and Lin (2010), we consider an equivalent but more e¤ective transformation. Let
p
the orthonormal matrix of Q be [P; 1m = m]. The columns in P are eigenvectors of Q corresponding
to the eigenvalue one, such that P 0 1m = 0, P 0 P = Im-1 and P P 0 = Q. Therefore, premultiplying
(24) by P 0 gives
P 0 Yst = 1 P 0 W1s Yst + 2 P 0 W2s Yst + P 0 X1;st

1

+ P 0 Vst :

(26)

 1;st = P 0 X1;st , Vst = P 0 Vst , W
 1s = P 0 W1s P , and W
 2s = P 0 W2s P . As
Let Yst = P 0 Yst , X

25

 1s P 0 and P 0 W2s = W
 2s P 0 , (26) can be rewritten as
P 0 W1s = W
 1s Yst + 2 W
 2s Yst + X
 1;st
Yst = 1 W
where Vst  N (0;  2v Im-1 ). Hence, (1 ; 2 ;

0
2
1 ; v )

1

+ Vst ;

(27)

can be estimated by maximizing the conditional

likelihood function is given by

ln L

=

qt
T P
P

dst [-

t=1 s=1

B.3

m-1
 1s - 2 W
 2s j
ln(2 v2 ) + ln jIm-1 - 1 W
2

1 
 1s Yst - 2 W
 2s Yst - X
 1;st
(Yst - 1 W
2 2v

0 
1 ) (Yst

 1s Yst - 2 W
 2s Yst - X
 1;st
- 1 W

1 )]:

Estimation of the selectivity bias

Let rst =

1 0
m 1m (Yst

- 1 W1s Yst - 2 W2s Yst - X1;st
rst = x2;st

where  st = -s ( t ) +

1 0
st + m 1m Vst .

from (28) with rst replaced by r^st =

Then,
1 0
m 1m (Yst

Then,

+ s ( t ) +  st ;

2

2

1 ).

(28)

and unknown parameters in s ( t ) can be estimated
0

-
^1 W1s Yst - 
^2 W2s Yst - X1;st ^ 1 ), where (^
1 ; 
^2 ; ^ 1 )

are the CML estimates. In this appendix, we give the asymptotic covariance of the OLS estimator for
the parametric selection-bias correction approach. The asymptotic covariance of the semiparametric
estimator can be derived in a similar way with appropriate modi cations (see Dahl, 2002, footnote
24).
Under the joint normality assumption
2
6
4
we have s ( t ) = E(

st jdst

3

2

3 2

2

7
6 0 7 6 
5  N (4
5;4
Jst (st )
0
 12
st

= 1;  t ) = E(

st jJst (st )

3

 12 7
5);
1

< Jst (0)) = - 12 '(Jst (0)) = - 12 '(-1 (Pst )),

where '() = ()=(). Hence, (28) can be written as

rst = x2;st

2

-  12 '(-1 (Pst )) +  st :

Pqt
Let 'st = '(-1 (Pst )) and '
^ st = '(-1 (P^st )), where P^st = exp(zst ^)= r=1
exp(zrt ^) and ^ is the
26

conditional logit estimator. The (infeasible) OLS estimator of  = (

0
0
2 ;  12 )

is given by

qt
qt
T
T
T
T
^ -1 P h
^ 0 P dst rst =  + ( P h
^0 h
^ -1 P h
^ 0 P dst [ +  12 (^
~ = ( P h
^0 h
'st - 'st )];
st
t t)
t
t t)
t
t=1

t=1

s=1

t=1

t=1

s=1

^ t = Pqt dst (x2;st ; -'
where h
^ st ). Let Ast = -1 (Pst )'st + '2st and
s=1
rt =

qt
P

s=1

dst

qt
P
@'(-1 (Pst ))
1
2
=
dst Ast
(Pst - Pst
)zst :
0
-1
@
( (Pst ))
s=1

p
Pqt
Let A = diagf s=1
dst Ast gt=1; ;T , H = (h01 ;    ; hT0 )0 , and r = (r01 ;    ; r0T )0 . We have T (~ d

) ! N (0; plim( T1 H 0 H)-1 ( T1 H 0 H)-1 ), where
=

1 0 2
2
H (  IT -  212 A +  12
r r0 )H;
T

PT Pqt
Pqt
Pqt
with  = [ t=1 s=1
Pst (zst - s=1
Prt zrt )0 (zst - s=1
Prt zrt )]-1 .29 Furthermore, under certain
regularity conditions, we can show that the feasible OLS estimator
qt
T
T
^ -1 P h
^ 0 P dst r^st
^ = ( P h
^0 h
t t)
t
t=1

t=1

s=1

is asymptotically equivalent to ~.

C

Data Description
[insert Table C.1 here]

Var( st jdst = 1) =  2 - 212 Ast ,  2 can be estimated by 
^ 2 =
^
where  st is the OLS estimation residual.
2 9 As

27

1
T

PT

t=1

Pqt

s=1

2
2
dst f^st -^
 212 [-1 (P^st )^
'st + '
^ st
]g,

Table C.1: Description of Data
Mean
0.37

SD
1.07

Min
-3.75

Max
8.28

Minutes played from the start of the game till the end of period t-1.

9.91

7.81

0

37.58

Fatigue

Minutes continuously played at the end of period t-1.

3.78

5.09

0

37.58

RPI

The previous year RPI of the opposing team.

0.55

0.08

0.38

0.66

Home

A dummy variable taking value one if it is a home game.

0.67

0.47

0

1

2nd Half

A dummy variable taking value one if it is the second half.

0.41

0.49

0

1

Lineup efficiency

The total efficiency score of the players in the lineup from the start of
the game till the end of period t-1.

1.63

1.22

-2.65

5.04

Lineup experience

The total minutes played by the players in the lineup from the start of
the game till the end of period t-1.

49.57

34.03

0

152.78

Lineup fatigue

The total minutes continuously played by the players in the lineup at
the end of period t-1.

18.92

14.06

0

91.70

Lineup fouls

The total number of fouls of the players in the lineup at the end of
period t-1.

3.13

2.77

0

15

One-substitution

A dummy variable taking value one if it takes one substitution from
the lineup in period t-1 to reach this lineup.

0.68

0.46

0

1

0.22

0.42

0

1

y

Label
Efficiency

Variable Definition
Current period efficiency score that is given by
(points+rebounds+assists+steals+blocks-misses-turnovers)/minutes.

x1

Experience

x2

z

Two-substitution

A dummy variable taking value one if it takes two substitutions from
the lineup in period t-1 to reach this lineup.
Number of observations: 2240; number of periods: 448

Table 1: ML Estimation of the Outcome Equation without Selectivity Bias Correction
Dep. Var.: Player Efficiency
Peer effects

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

0.0638***

0.0651***

0.0841***
(0.0279)

Same-type peer effects

(0.0175)

Cross-type peer effects

(0.0175)

0.0345
(0.0216)

Experience
Fatigue
RPI
Home
nd

2 Half
Player dummies
Log likelihood
Sample size

0.0154***

0.0154***

0.0156***

(0.0053)

(0.0053)

(0.0053)

-0.0083

-0.0084

-0.0083

(0.0059)

(0.0058)

(0.0058)

-1.1677***

-1.1538***

-1.1914***

(0.3043)

(0.3035)

(0.3028)

-0.0030

-0.0034

-0.0031

(0.0490)

(0.0489)

(0.0489)

-0.2159***

-0.2142***

-0.2197***

(0.0683)

(0.0681)

(0.0680)

Yes
-3294.83
2240

Yes

Yes
-3291.17

-3292.47

2240

Model 1: the outcome equation with homogenous peer effects
Model 2: the outcome equation with both same-type and cross-type peer effects
Model 3: the outcome equation with only cross-type peer effects
Standard errors in parentheses.
Statistical significance: ***p<0.01 ; **p<0.05 ; *p<0.1.

2240

Table 2: Fixed Effect ML Estimation of the Outcome Equation
Dep. Var.: Player Efficiency
Same-type peer effects

Model 2
0.1432
(0.1000)

Cross-type peer effects

Model 3
0.0534***
(0.0220)

0.1532
(0.1655)

Experience
Fatigue
Player dummies
Log likelihood
Sample size

0.0337***

0.0316***

(0.0098)

(0.0091)

-0.0198***

-0.0186***

(0.0075)

(0.0070)

Yes
-2590.55

Yes
-2591.03

2240

Model 2: the outcome equation with both same-type and cross-type peer effects
Model 3: the outcome equation with only cross-type peer effects
Standard errors in parentheses.
Statistical significance: ***p<0.01 ; **p<0.05 ; *p<0.1.

2240

Table 3: Conditional Logit Estimation of the Selection Equation
Dep. Var.: Probability of Lineup Selection
0.1565*
Lineup efficiency
(0.0829)

Lineup experience

-0.0268***
(0.0071)

Lineup fatigue

-0.0766***
(0.0129)

Lineup fouls

-0.1199***
(0.0512)

One-substitution

4.4993***
(0.2712)

Two-substitution

2.2187***
(0.2439)

Player dummies
Log likelihood
Sample size

Yes
-755.94
448

Standard errors in parentheses.
Statistical significance: ***p<0.01 ; **p<0.05 ; *p<0.1.

Table 4: OLS Estimation of Individual-Invariant Regressors in the Outcome Equation
Dep. Var.: Lineup-Averaged
Estimation Residuals from Table 2
RPI
Home
nd

2 Half
σ12

Model 2
Parametric
Series

Model 3
Parametric
Series

-1.0734***

-1.0157***

-1.3081***

-1.2369***

(0.2339)

(0.2331)

(0.3100)

(0.3094)

0.0080

0.0151

0.0067

0.0157

(0.0388)

(0.0386)

(0.0515)

(0.0512)

-0.3526***

-0.3557***

-0.3570***

-0.3597***

(0.0360)

(0.0362)

(0.0477)

(0.0480)

-0.0325

-0.0234

(0.0324)

(0.0429)

Wald test for selectivity bias

11.1764**

9.1486*

[0.0247]

Sample size

448

448

Model 2: the outcome equation with both same-type and cross-type peer effects
Model 3: the outcome equation with only cross-type peer effects
Standard errors in parentheses; p values in brackets
Statistical significance: ***p<0.01 ; **p<0.05 ; *p<0.1.

[0.0575]
448

448

